In a partial monitoring game, the learner repeatedly chooses an action, the environment responds with an outcome, and then the learner suffers a loss and receives a feedback signal, both of which are fixed functions of the action and the outcome. The goal of the learner is to minimize his regret, which is the difference between his total cumulative loss and the total loss of the best fixed action in hindsight. In this paper we characterize the minimax regret of any partial monitoring game with finitely many actions and outcomes. It turns out that the minimax regret of any such game is either zero, Θ( √ T ), Θ(T 2/3 ), or Θ(T ). We provide computationally efficient learning algorithms that achieve the minimax regret within logarithmic factor for any game. In addition to the bounds on the minimax regret, if we assume that the outcomes are generated in an i.i.d. fashion, we prove individual upper bounds on the expected regret.
Introduction
Partial monitoring provides a mathematical framework for sequential decision making problems with imperfect feedback. Various problems of interest can be modeled as partial monitoring instances, such as learning with expert advice [Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994] , the multi-armed bandit problem [Auer et al., 2002] , dynamic pricing [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003] , the dark pool problem [Agarwal et al., 2010] , label efficient prediction [Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2005] , and linear and convex optimization with full or bandit feedback [Zinkevich, 2003 , Abernethy et al., 2008 , Flaxman et al., 2005 .
In this paper we restrict ourselves to finite games, i.e., games where both the set of actions available to the learner and the set of possible outcomes generated by the environment are finite. A finite partial monitoring game G is described by a pair of N × M matrices: the loss matrix L and the feedback matrix H. The entries L i,j of L are real numbers lying in, say, the interval [0, 1]. The entries H i,j of H belong to an alphabet Σ on which we do not impose any structure and we only assume that learner is able to distinguish distinct elements of the alphabet.
The game proceeds in T rounds according to the following protocol. First, G = (L, H) is announced for both players. In each round t = 1, 2, . . . , T , the learner chooses an action I t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } and simultaneously, the environment, or opponent, chooses an outcome J t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }. Then, the learner receives as a feedback the entry H It,Jt . The learner incurs instantaneous loss L It,Jt , which is not revealed to him. The feedback can be thought of as a masked information about the outcome J t . In some cases H It,Jt might uniquely determine the outcome, in other cases the feedback might give only partial or no information about the outcome.
The learner is scored according to the loss matrix L. In round t the learner incurs an instantaneous loss of L It,Jt . The goal of the learner is to keep low his total loss T t=1 L It,Jt . Equivalently, the learner's performance can also be measured in terms of his regret, i.e., the total loss of the learner is compared with the loss of best fixed action in hindsight. Since no non-trivial bound can be given on the learner's total loss, we resort to regret analysis in which the total loss of the learner is compared with the loss of best fixed action in hindsight. The regret is defined as the difference of these two losses.
In general, the regret grows with the number of rounds T . If the regret is sublinear in T , the learner is said to be Hannan consistent, and this means that the learner's average per-round loss approaches the average per-round loss of the best action in hindsight. Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [2001] were one of the first to study the regret of these games. They proved that for any finite game (L, H), either for any algorithm the regret can be Ω(T ) in the worst case, or there exists an algorithm which has regret O(T 3/4 ) on any outcome sequence 1 . This result was later improved by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2006] who showed that the algorithm of Piccolboni and Schindelhauer has regret O(T 2/3 ). Furthermore, they provided an example of a finite game, a variant of label-efficient prediction, for which any algorithm has regret Θ(T 2/3 ) in the worst case. However, for many games O(T 2/3 ) is not optimal. For example, games with full feedback (i.e., when the feedback uniquely determines the outcome) can be viewed as a special instance of the problem of learning with expert advice and in this case it is known that the "EWA forecaster" has regret O( √ T ); see e.g. Lugosi and Cesa-Bianchi [2006, Chapter 3] . Similarly, for games with "bandit feedback" (i.e., when the feedback determines the instantaneous loss) the INF algorithm [Audibert and Bubeck, 2009 ] and the Exp3 algorithm [Auer et al., 2002] achieve O( √ T ) regret as well.
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This leaves open the problem of determining the minimax regret (i.e., optimal worst-case regret) of any given game (L, H). A partial progress was made in this direction by Bartók et al. [2010] who characterized (almost) all finite games with M = 2 outcomes. They showed that the minimax regret of any "nondegenerate" finite game with two outcomes falls into one of four categories: zero, Θ( √ T ), Θ(T 2/3 ) or Θ(T ). They gave a combinatoric-geometric condition on the matrices L, H that determines the category a game belongs to. Additionally, they constructed an efficient algorithm that, for any game, achieves the minimax regret rate associated to the game within poly-logarithmic factor.
In this paper, we consider the general problem of classifying partial-monitoring games with any finite number of actions and outcomes. We investigate the problem under two different opponent models: the oblivious adversarial and the stochastic opponent. In the oblivious adversarial model, the outcomes are arbitrarily generated by an adversary with the constraint that they cannot depend on the actions chosen by the learner. Equivalently, an oblivious adversary can be thought of as an oracle that chooses a sequence of outcomes before the game begins. In the stochastic model, the outcomes are generated by a sequence of i.i.d. random variables.
In the stochastic model, an alternative definition of regret is used; instead of comparing the cumulative loss of the learner of that of the best fixed action in hindsight, the base of the comparison is the expected cumulative loss of the action with the smallest expected loss, given the distribution the outcomes are generated from. More formally, the regret of an algorithm A under outcome distribution p is defined as
This paper is based on the results of Bartók, Pál, and Szepesvári [2011] , Bartók, Zolghadr, and Szepesvári [2012] , and Foster and Rakhlin [2012] . We summarize the results of these works to create a complete and 1 The notations O(·) and Θ(·) hide polylogarithmic factors. 2 We ignore the dependence of regret on the number of actions or any other parameters. The gap between 0 and 1/2 was proven by Antos et al. [2012] , while the gap between 2/3 and 1 was shown by Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [2001] . The minimax regret of the "revealing action game" was proven to be of Θ(T 2/3 ) by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2006] . The gap between 1/2 and 2/3 is the result of this work, completing the characterization.
self-contained reference for the recent advancements on finite partial monitoring. The results include a characterization of non-degenerate games against adversarial opponents, a full characterization of games as well as individual regret bounds against stochastic opponents.
The characterization result, in both cases, shows that there are only four classes of games in terms of the minimax regret:
• Trivial games with zero minimax regret,
• "Easy" games with Θ( √ T ) minimax regret,
• "Hard" games with Θ(T 2/3 ) minimax regret, and
• Hopeless games with Ω(T ) minimax regret.
A visualization of the classification is depicted in Figure 1 .
Definitions and notations
Let N denote the set {1, . . . , N }. For a subset S ⊂ N we use 1 S ∈ {0, 1} N to denote the vector with ones on the coordinates in S and zeros outside. A vector a ∈ R N indexed by j is sometimes denoted by [a j ] j∈ [N ] . Standard basis vectors are denoted by {e i }.
Recall from the introduction that an instance of partial monitoring with N actions and M outcomes is defined by the pair of matrices L ∈ R N ×M and H ∈ Σ N ×M , where Σ is an arbitrary set of symbols. In each round t, the opponent chooses an outcome j t ∈ M and simultaneously the learner chooses an action i t ∈ N . Then, the feedback H It,Jt is revealed and the learner suffers the loss L it,jt . It is important to note that the loss is not revealed to the learner, whereas L and H are revealed before the game begins.
The following definitions are essential for understanding how the structure of L and H determines the "hardness" of a game. Let ∆ M denote the probability simplex in
. Elements of ∆ M will also be called opponent strategies as p ∈ ∆ M represents an outcome distribution that a stochastic opponent can use to generate outcomes. Let i denote the column vector consisting of the i th row of L. Action i is called optimal under strategy p if its expected loss is not greater than that of any other action i ∈ N . That is, i p ≤ i p. Determining which action is optimal under opponent strategies yields the cell decomposition 3 of the probability simplex ∆ M :
Definition 1 (Cell decomposition). For every action i ∈ N , let C i = {p ∈ ∆ M : action i is optimal under p}. The sets C 1 , . . . , C N constitute the cell decomposition of ∆ M .
Now we can define the following important properties of actions:
Definition 2 (Properties of actions).
• Action i is called dominated if C i = ∅. If an action is not dominated then it is called non-dominated.
• Action i is called degenerate if it is non-dominated and there exists an action i such that C i C i .
• If an action is neither dominated nor degenerate then it is called Pareto-optimal. The set of Paretooptimal actions is denoted by P.
• Action i is called duplicate if there exists another action j = i such that i = j .
From the definition of cells we see that a cell is either empty or it is a closed polytope. Furthermore, Pareto-optimal actions have (M − 1)-dimensional cells. The following definition, important for our analyses, also uses the dimensionality of polytopes:
Definition 3 (Neighbors). Two Pareto-optimal actions i and j are neighbors if C i ∩ C j is an (M − 2)-dimensional polytope. Let N be the set of unordered pairs over N that contains neighboring action-pairs. The neighborhood action set of two neighboring actions i, j is defined as N
Note that the neighborhood action set N + i,j naturally contains i and j. If N + i,j contains some other action
Now we turn our attention to how the feedback matrix H is used. In general, the elements of the feedback matrix H can be arbitrary symbols. Nevertheless, the nature of the symbols themselves does not matter in terms of the structure of the game. What determines the feedback structure of a game is the occurrence of identical symbols in each row of H. To "standardize" the feedback structure, the signal matrix is defined for each action: Definition 4. Let s i be the number of distinct symbols in the i th row of H and let σ 1 , . . . , σ si ∈ Σ be an enumeration of those symbols. Then the signal matrix S i ∈ {0, 1} si×M of action i is defined as
Note that the signal matrix of action i is just the incidence matrix of symbols and outcomes, assuming action i is chosen. Furthermore, if p ∈ ∆ M is the opponent's strategy (or in the adversarial setting, the relative frequency of outcomes in time steps when action i is chosen), then S i p gives the distribution (or relative frequency) of the symbols underlying action i. In fact, it is also true that observing H It,Jt is equivalent to observing the vector S It e Jt , where e k is the k th unit vector in the standard basis of R M . From now on we assume without loss of generality that the learner's observation at time step t is the random vector Y t = S It e Jt . Note that the dimensionality of this vector depends on the action chosen by the learner, namely Y t ∈ R s I t . Let Im M denote the image space (or column space) of a matrix M . The following two definitions play a key role in classifying partial-monitoring games.
Definition 5 (Global observability [Piccolboni and Schindelhauer, 2001] ). A partial-monitoring game (L, H) admits the global observability condition, if for all pairs i, j of actions, i − j ∈ ⊕ k∈N Im S k .
Definition 6 (Local observability). A pair of neighboring actions i, j is said to be locally observable if
Im S k . We denote by L ⊂ N the set of locally observable pairs of actions (the pairs are unordered). A game satisfies the local observability condition if every pair of neighboring actions is locally observable, i.e., if L = N .
The intuition behind these definitions is that if i − j ∈ ⊕ k∈D Im S k for some subset D of actions then the expected difference of the losses of actions i and j can be estimated with observations from actions in D. We will later see that the above condition necessary for haveing unbiased estimates for the loss differences.
It is easy to see that local observability implies global observability. Also, from Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [2001] we know that if global observability does not hold then the game has linear minimax regret. From now on, we only deal with games that admit the global observability condition.
Examples
To illustrate the concepts of global and local observability, we present some examples of partial-monitoring games.
Full-information games Consider a game G = (L, H), where every row of the feedback matrix consists of pairwise different symbols. Without loss of generality we may assume that
In this case the learner receives the outcome as feedback at the end of every time step, hence we call it the full-information case. It is easy to see that the signal matrix of any action i is the identity matrix of dimension M . Consequently, for any ∈ R M , ∈ Im S i and thus any full-information game is locally observable.
Bandit games The next games we consider are games G = (L, H) with L = H. In this case the feedback the learner receives is identical to the loss he suffers at every time step. For this reason, we call these types of games bandit games.
For an action i, let the the rows of S i correspond to the symbols σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ si , where s i is the number of different symbols in the i th row of H. Since we assumed that L = H, we know that these symbols are real numbers (losses). It follows from the construction of the signal matrix that
for all i ∈ N . It follows that all bandit games are locally observable.
A hopeless game We define the following game G = (L, H) by L = 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 5 4 3 2 1 , H = α 1 α 2 α 3 α 4 * * β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 * * .
We make the following observations:
1. Neither of actions 1 and 2 are dominated. Thus the game is not trivial.
2. The difference of the loss vectors 2 − 1 = 5 3 1 −1 −3 −5 .
3. The image space of the signal matrices Im
The three points together imply that the game is not globally observable.
Dynamic pricing
In dynamic pricing, a vendor (learner) tries to sell his product to a buyer (opponent). The buyer secretly chooses a maximum price (outcome) while the seller tries to sell it at some price (action). If the outcome is lower than the action then no transaction happens and the seller suffers some constant loss. Otherwise the buyer buys the product and the seller's loss is the difference between the seller's price and the buyer's price. The feedback for the seller is, however, only the binary observation if the transaction happened (y for yes and n for no). The finite version of the game can be described with the following matrices:
Simple algebra gives that all action pairs are neighbors. In fact, there is a single point on the probability simplex that is common to all of the cells, namely
We show that the locally observable action pairs are the "consecutive" actions ({i, i + 1}). The difference
with i − 1 zeros at the beginning. The signal matrix S i is
where the "switch" is after i − 1 columns. Thus,
On the other hand, action pairs that are not consecutive are not locally observable. For example,
while both Im S 1 and Im S 3 contain only vectors whose first two coordinates are identical. Thus, dynamic pricing is not a locally observable game. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that global observability holds.
Summary of results
In this paper we present new algorithms for finite partial-monitoring games-NeigborhoodWatch for the adversarial case and CBP for the stochastic case-and provide regret bounds. Our results on the minimax regret can be summarized in the following two classification theorems.
Theorem 1 (Classification for games against stochastic opponents). Let G = (L, H) be a finite partialmonitoring game. Let K be the number of non-dominated actions in G. The minimax expected regret of G against stochastic opponents is Theorem 2 (Classification for games against adversarial opponents). Let G = (L, H) be a non-degenerate finite partial-monitoring game. Let K be the number of non-dominated actions in G. The minimax expected regret of G against adversarial opponents is
G is not globally observable.
For the stochastic case, we additionally present individual bounds on the regret of any finite partialmonitoring game, i.e., bounds that depend on the strategy of the opponent.
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Theorem 3. Let (L, H) be an N by M partial-monitoring game. For a fixed opponent strategy p * ∈ ∆ M , let δ i denote the difference between the expected loss of action i and an optimal action. For any time horizon T , algorithm CBP with parameters α > 1,
Theorem 3 gives a very general bound on the regret. This bound will be used to derive all the upper bounds that concern the regret of games against stochastic environments: It translates to a logarithmic individual upper bound on the regret of locally observable games (Corollary 1); it gives the minimax upper bound of O( √ T ) for locally observable games (Corollary 3), the minimax upper bound of O(T 2/3 ) for globally observable games (Corollary 2). Additionally and quite surprisingly, it also follows from the above bound that even for not locally observable games, if we assume that the opponent is "benign" in some sense, the minimax regret of O( √ T ) still holds. For the precise statement, see Theorem 5. In the next section we give a lower bound on the minimax regret for games that are not locally observable. This bound is valid for both the stochastic and the adversarial settings and is necessary for proving the classification theorems. Then, in Sections 5 and 6, we describe and analyze the algorithms CBP and NeigborhoodWatch. The first algorithm, CBP for Confidence Bound Partial monitoring, is shown to achieve the desired regret upper bounds for any finite partial-monitoring game against stochastic opponents. The second algorithm, NeigborhoodWatch, works for locally observable non-degenerate games. We show that for these games, the algorithm achieves the desired O( √ T ) regret bound against adversarial opponents.
A lower bound for not locally observable games
In this section we prove that for any game that does not satisfy the local observability condition has expected minimax regret of Ω(T 2/3 ).
Theorem 4. Let G = (L, H) be an N by M partial-monitoring game. Assume that there exist two neighboring actions i and j that are not locally observable. Then there exists a problem dependent constant c(G) such that for any algorithm A and time horizon T there exists an opponent strategy p such that the expected regret satisfies
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that the two neighbor cells in the condition are C 1 and C 2 . Let C 3 = C 1 ∩ C 2 . For i = 1, 2, 3, let N i be the set of actions associated with cell C i . Note that N 3 may be the empty set. Let N 4 = N \ (N 1 ∪ N 2 ∪ N 3 ). By our convention for naming loss vectors, 1 and 2 are the loss vectors for C 1 and C 2 , respectively. Let L 3 collect the loss vectors of actions which lie on the open segment connecting 1 and 2 . It is easy to see that L 3 is the set of loss vectors that correspond to the cell C 3 . We define L 4 as the set of all the other loss vectors. For i = 1, 2, 3, 4, let
According to the lack of local observability,
where we used that (Im M ) ⊥ = Ker(M ). Thus, there exists a vector v such that v ∈ Ker S 1 ∩ Ker S 2 and ( 2 − 1 ) v = 0. By scaling we can assume that ( 2 − 1 ) v = 1. Note that since v ∈ Ker S 1 ∩ Ker S 2 and the rowspaces of both S 1 and S 2 contain the vector (1, 1, . . . , 1), the coordinates of v sum up to zero.
Let p 0 be an arbitrary probability vector in the relative interior of C 3 . It is easy to see that for any ε > 0 small enough,
Let us fix a deterministic algorithm A and a time horizon
T denote the expected regret of the algorithm under opponent strategy p i . For i = 1, 2 and j = 1, . . . , 4, let N i j denote the expected number of times the algorithm chooses an action from N j , assuming the opponent plays strategy
From the definition of L 3 we know that for any ∈ L 3 , − 1 = η ( 2 − 1 ) and − 2 = (1 − η )( 1 − 2 ) for some 0 < η < 1. Let λ 1 = min ∈L3 η and λ 2 = min ∈L3 (1 − η ) and λ = min(λ 1 , λ 2 ) if L 3 = ∅ and let λ = 1/2, otherwise. Finally, let β i = min ∈L4 ( − i ) p i and β = min(β 1 , β 2 ). Note that λ, β > 0.
As the first step of the proof, we lower bound the expected regret R
(1)
T and R
T in terms of the values N i j , ε, λ and β:
For the next step, we need the following lemma. Lemma 1. There exists a (problem dependent) constant c such that the following inequalities hold:
Using the above lemma we can lower bound the expected regret. Let r = argmin i∈{1,2} N i 4 . It is easy to see that for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, 3,
If i = r then this inequality is one of the inequalities from Lemma 1. If i = r then it is a trivial lower bounding by subtracting a positive value. From (1) we have
β . Now assume that, at the beginning of the game, the opponent randomly chooses between strategies p 1 and p 2 with equal probability. The the expected regret of the algorithm is lower bounded by
Choosing ε = c 3 T −1/3 we get
where x = N r 4 /T 2/3 . Now we see that c 3 > 0 can be chosen to be small enough, independently of T so that, for any choice of x, the quadratic expression in the parenthesis is bounded away from zero, and simultaneously, ε is small enough so that the threshold condition in Lemma 10 is satisfied, completing the proof of Theorem 4.
The stochastic case
In this section we present and analyze our algorithm CBP for Confidence Bound Partial monitoring that achieves near optimal regret for any finite partial-monitoring game against stochastic opponents. In particular, we show that CBP achieves O( √ T ) regret for locally observable games and O(T 2/3 ) regret for globally observable games.
The proposed algorithm
In the core of the algorithm lie the concepts of observer action sets and observer vectors:
Definition 8 (Observer sets and observer vectors). The observer set V i,j ⊂ N underlying a pair of neighboring actions {i, j} ∈ N is a set of actions such that
In what follows, the choice of the observer sets and vectors is restricted so that V i,j = V j,i and v i,j,k = −v j,i,k . Furthermore, the observer set V i,j is constrained to be a superset of N + i,j and, in particular, when a pair {i, j} is locally observable,
In a nutshell, CBP works as follows. For every neighboring action pair it maintains an unbiased estimate of the expected difference of their losses. It also keeps a confidence width for these estimates. If at time step t an estimate is "confident enough" to determine which action is better, the algorithm excludes some actions from the set of potentially optimal actions.
For two actions i, j, let δ i,j denote the expected difference of their losses. That is,
where p * is the opponent strategy. At any time step t, the estimate of the loss difference of actions i and j is calculated asδ
The confidence bound of the loss difference estimate is defined as
with some preset parameter α. We call the estimateδ i,
In every time step t, the algorithm uses the estimates and the widths to select a set of candidate actions. If an estimateδ i,j (t) is confident then the algorithm assumes that the opponent strategy p * lies in the halfspace defined as {p ∈ ∆ M : sgn(δ i,j (t))( i − j ) p > 0}. Taking the intersection of these halfspaces for all the action pairs with confident estimates, we arrive at a polyitope that contains the opponent strategy with high probability. Then, the set of potentially optimal actions P(t) is defined as the actions whose cells intersect with the above polytope. We also need to maintain the set N (t) of neighboring actions, since it may happen that action pairs that are originally neighbors do not share an M − 2 dimensional facet in this polytope. Then, the actions candidate for choosing by the algorithm is defined as the union of observer action sets of current neighboring pairs: Q(t) = ∪ {i,j}∈N (t) V i,j . Finally, the action is chosen to be the one that potentially reduces the remaining uncertainty the most:
i,j } with fixed v i,j,k precomputed and used by the algorithm.
Decaying exploration. The algorithm depicted above could be shown to achieve low regret for locally observable games. However, for a game that is only globally observable, the opponent can choose a strategy that causes the algorithm to suffer linear regret: Let action 1 and 2 be a neighboring action pair that is not locally observable. It follows that their observer action set must contain a third action 3 with C 3 ⊆ C 1 ∩ C 2 . If the opponent chooses a strategy p ∈ C 1 ∩ C 2 then actions 1 and 2 are optimal while action 3 is not. Unfortunately, the algorithm will choose action 3 linearly many times in its effort to (futilely) estimate the loss difference of actions 1 and 2.
To prevent the algorithm from falling in the above trap, we introduce the decaying exploration rule. This rule, described below, upper bounds the number of times an action can be chosen for only information seeking purposes. For this, we introduce the set of rarely chosen actions,
where η k ∈ R, f : N → R are tuning parameters to be chosen later. Then, the set of actions available at time t is restricted to
Found in/at N, M ∈ N number of actions and outcomes N {1, . . . , N }, set of actions
confidence width for action i ∈ N Definition 8 Table 1 : List of basic symbols
We will show that with these modifications, the algorithm achieves O(T 2/3 ) regret on globally observable games, while it will also be shown to achieve an O( √ T ) regret when the opponent uses a benign strategy. Pseudocode for the algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
It remains to specify the function getPolytope. It gets the array halfSpace as input. The array halfSpace stores which neighboring action pairs have a confident estimate on the difference of their expected losses, along with the sign of the difference (if confident). Each of these confident pairs define an open halfspace, namely
The function getPolytope calculates the open polytope defined as the intersection of the above halfspaces. Then for all i ∈ P it checks if C i intersects with the open polytope. If so, then i will be an element of P(t). Similarly, for every {i, j} ∈ N , it checks if C i ∩ C j intersects with the open polytope and puts the pair in N (t) if it does.
For the convenience of the reader, we include a list of symbols used in this Chapter in Table 1 . The list of symbols used in the algorithm is shown in Table 2 .
Computational complexity The computationally heavy parts of the algorithm are the initial calculation of the cell decomposition and the function getPolytope. All of these require linear programming. In the preprocessing phase we need to solve N + N 2 linear programs to determine cells and neighboring pairs of cells. Then in every round, at most N 2 linear programs are needed. The algorithm can be sped up by "caching" previously solved linear programs.
Analysis of the algorithm
The first theorem in this section is an individual upper bound on the regret of CBP.
Theorem 3. Let (L, H) be an N by M partial-monitoring game. For a fixed opponent strategy p * ∈ ∆ M , let δ i denote the difference between the expected loss of action i and an optimal action. For any time horizon
Proof. We use the convention that, for any variable x used by the algorithm, x(t) denotes the value of x at the end of time step t. For example, n i (t) is the number of times action i is chosen up to and including time step t. The proof is based on three lemmas. The first lemma shows that the estimateδ i,j (t) is in the vicinity of δ i,j with high probability.
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Lemma 2. For any {i, j} ∈ N , t ≥ 1,
If for some t, i, j, the event whose probability is upper-bounded in Lemma 2 happens, we say that a confidence interval fails. Let G t be the event that no confidence intervals fail in time step t and let B t be its complement event. An immediate corollary of Lemma 2 is that the sum of the probabilities that some confidence interval fails is small:
To prepare for the next lemma, we need some new notations. For the next definition we need to denote the dependence of the random sets P(t), N (t) on the outcomes ω from the underlying sample space Ω. For this, we will use the notation P ω (t) and N ω (t). With this, we define the set of plausible configurations to be
Call π = (i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i r ) (r ≥ 0) a path in N ⊆ N 2 if {i s , i s+1 } ∈ N for all 0 ≤ s ≤ r − 1 (when r = 0 there is no restriction on π). The path is said to start at i 0 and end at i r . In what follows we denote by i * an optimal action under p * (i.e., i * p * ≤ i p * holds for all actions i). The set of paths that connect i to i * and lie in N will be denoted by B i (N ). The next lemma shows that B i (N ) is non-empty whenever N is such that for some P , (P , N ) ∈ Ψ:
Lemma 3. Take an action i and a plausible pair (P , N ) ∈ Ψ such that i ∈ P . Then there exists a path π that starts at i and ends at i * that lies in N .
|V is−1,is | .
5 The proofs of technical lemmas can be found in the appendix.
According to the previous lemma, for each Pareto-optimal action i, the quantity d i is well-defined and finite. The definition is extended to degenerate actions by defining
. When k(t) = I t this happens because k(t) ∈ N + (t) and k(t) / ∈ R(t), i.e., the action k(t) is a "purely" information seeking action which has been sampled frequently. When this holds we say that the "decaying exploration rule is in effect at time step t". The corresponding event is denoted by D t = {k(t) = I t }. Let δ i be defined as max j∈N δ i,j , i.e., δ i is the excess expected loss of action i compared to an optimal action. Lemma 4. Fix any t ≥ 1.
1. Take any action i. On the event G t ∩ D t , 6 from i ∈ P(t) ∪ N + (t) it follows that
2. Take any action k. On the event G t ∩ D c t , from I t = k it follows that
We are now ready to start the proof. By Wald's identity, we can rewrite the expected regret as follows:
Hence,
Here, the first term can be bounded using (2). Let us thus consider the elements of the second sum:
The first δ k corresponds to the initialization phase of the algorithm when every action gets chosen once. The next paragraphs are devoted to upper bounding the above four expressions (3)-(6). Note that, if action k is optimal, that is, if δ k = 0 then all the terms are zero. Thus, we can assume from now on that δ k > 0.
We use case 2 of Lemma 4 with the choice i = k. Thus, from I t = k, we get that i = k ∈ P(t) ∪ N + (t) and so the conclusion of the lemma gives
Therefore, we have
Term (4): Consider the event G t ∩ D c t ∩ {k ∈ P(t) ∪ N + (t)}. We use case 2 of Lemma 4. The lemma gives that that
We know that k ∈ V(t) = ∪ {i,j}∈N (t) V i,j . Let Φ t be the set of pairs {i, j} in N (t) ⊆ N such that k ∈ V i,j . For any {i, j} ∈ Φ t , we also have that i, j ∈ P(t) and thus if l {i,j} = argmax l∈{i,j} δ l then
Therefore, if we define l(k) as the action with
then it follows that
Note that δ l(k) can be zero and thus we use the convention c/0 = ∞. Also, since k is not in
Then, with the same argument as in the previous case (and recalling that f (t) is increasing), we get
We remark that without the concept of "rarely sampled actions", the above term would scale with 1/δ 2 l(k) , causing high regret. This is why the "vanilla version" of the algorithm fails on hard games.
Term (5): Consider the event G t ∩ D t ∩ {k ∈ P(t) ∪ N + (t)}. From case 1 of Lemma 4 we have that
Term (6): Consider the event G t ∩ D t ∩ {k ∈ P(t) ∪ N + (t)}. Since k ∈ P(t) ∪ N + (t) we know that k ∈ V(t) ∩ R(t) ⊆ R(t) and hence n k (t − 1) ≤ η k f (t). With the same argument as in the cases (3) and (4) we get that
To conclude the proof of Theorem 3, we set η k = W 2/3 k , f (t) = α 1/3 t 2/3 log 1/3 t and, with the notation
An implication of Theorem 3 is an upper bound on the individual regret of locally observable games:
Proof. If a game is locally observable then V \ N + = ∅, leaving the last two sums of the statement of Theorem 3 zero.
The following corollary is an upper bound on the minimax regret of any globally observable game.
Corollary 2. Let G be a globally observable game. Then there exists a constant c such that the expected regret can be upper bounded independently of the choice of p * as
The following theorem is an upper bound on the minimax regret of any globally observable game against "benign" opponents. To state the theorem, we need a new definition. Let A be some subset of actions in G. We call A a point-local game in G if i∈A C i = ∅.
Theorem 5. Let G be a globally observable game. Let ∆ ⊆ ∆ M be some subset of the probability simplex such that its topological closure ∆ has ∆ ∩ C i ∩ C j = ∅ for every {i, j} ∈ N \ L. Then there exists a constant c such that for every p * ∈ ∆ , algorithm CBP with parameters α > 1,
where b is the size of the largest point-local game, and d pmax is a game-dependent constant.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we use a scheme similar to the proof of Theorem 3. Repeating that proof, we arrive at the same expression
where G t and D t denote the events that no confidence intervals fail, and the decaying exploration rule is in effect at time step t, respectively. From the condition of ∆ we have that there exists a positive constant ρ 1 such that for every neighboring action pair {i, j} ∈ N \ L, max(δ i , δ j ) ≥ ρ 1 . We know from Lemma 4 that if D t happens then for any pair
then the decaying exploration rule can not be in effect. Therefore, terms (5) and (6) can be upper bounded by g −1 (ρ 1 ). With the value ρ 1 defined in the previous paragraph we have that for any action k ∈ V \ N + , l(k) ≥ ρ 1 holds, and therefore term (4) can be upper bounded by
using that d k , defined in the proof of Theorem 3, is at most 2N . It remains to carefully upper bound term (3). For that, we first need a definition and a lemma. Let A ρ = {i ∈ N : δ i ≤ ρ}.
Lemma 5. Let G = (L, H) be a finite partial-monitoring game and p ∈ ∆ M an opponent strategy. There exists a ρ 2 > 0 such that A ρ2 is a point-local game in G.
To upper bound term (3), with ρ 2 introduced in the above lemma and γ > 0 specified later, we write
where d pmax is defined as the maximum d k value within point-local games.
Let b be the number of actions in the largest point-local game. Putting everything together we have
Now we choose γ to be
and we get
Remark 1. Note that the above theorem implies that CBP does not need to have any prior knowledge about ∆ to achieve √ T regret. This is why we say our algorithm is "adaptive".
An immediate implication of Theorem 5 is the following minimax bound for locally observable games:
Corollary 3. Let G be a locally observable finite partial monitoring game. Then there exists a constant c such that for every p ∈ ∆ M ,
Example
In this section we demonstrate the results of the previous section through the example of Dynamic Pricing. From Section 2.1 we know that dynamic pricing is not a locally observable game. That is, the minimax regret of the game is Θ(T 2/3 ). Now, we introduce a restriction on the space of opponent strategies such that the condition of Theorem 5 is satisfied. We need to prevent non-consecutive actions from being simultaneously optimal. A somewhat stronger condition is that out of three actions i < j < k, the loss of j should not be more than that of both i and k. We can prevent this from happening by preventing it for every triple i − 1, i, i + 1. Hence, a "bad" opponent strategy would satisfy
After rearranging, the above two inequalities yield the constraints
for every i = 2, . . . , N − 1. Note that there is no constraint on p N . If we want to avoid by a margin these inequalities to be satisfied, we arrive at the constraints
for some ρ > 0, for every i = 2, . . . , N − 1.
In conclusion, we define the restricted opponent set to
The intuitive interpretation of this constraint is that the probability of the higher maximum price of the costumer should not decrease too fast. This constraint does not allow to have zero probabilities, and thus it is too restrictive. Another way to construct a subset of ∆ M that is isolated from "dangerous" boundaries is to include only "hilly" distributions. We call a distribution p ∈ ∆ M hilly if it has a peak point i * ∈ N , and there exist ξ 1 , . . . , ξ i * −1 < 1 and ξ i * +1 , . . . , ξ N < 1 such that
We now show that with the right choice of ξ i , under a hilly distribution with peak i * , only action i * and maybe action i * − 1 can be optimal.
thus, if ξ i−1 ≤ 1/c then the expected loss of action i is less than or equal to that of action i − 1.
If i
≥ i * then ( i+1 − i ) p = cp i − (p i+1 + · · · + p N ) ≥ p i    c − (ξ i+1 + ξ i+1 ξ i+2 + · · · + N j=i+1 ξ j )    .
Now if we let
and thus if we choose ξ ≤ c c+1 then the expected loss of action i is less than or equal to that of action i + 1.
So far in all the calculations we allowed equalities. If we want to achieve that only action i * and possibly action i * − 1 are optimal, we use
If an opponent strategy is hilly with ξ i satisfying all the above criteria, we call that strategy sufficiently hilly. Now we are ready to state the corollary of Theorem 5:
Corollary 4. Consider the dynamic pricing game with N actions and M outcomes. If we restrict the set of opponent strategies ∆ to the set of all sufficiently hilly distributions then the minimax regret of the game is upper bounded by
for some constant C > 0 that depends on the game G = (L, H) and the choice of ∆ . i j G Figure 2 : To each vertex i in the graph G we associate an algorithm A i . The algorithm plays an action from the distribution q t i over its neighborhood set N i and receives partial information about relative loss between the node i and its neighbor. The other piece of the partial information comes from the times when a neighboring algorithm A j is run and the action i is picked.
Remark 2. Note that the number of actions and outcomes N = M does not appear in the bound because the size of the largest point local game with the restricted strategy set is always 2, irrespectively of the number of actions.
The adversarial case
Now we turn our attention to playing against adversarial opponents. We propose and analyze the algorithm NeigborhoodWatch. We show that the algorithm achieves O( √ T ) regret on locally observable games.
Method
The method is a two-level procedure motivated by Foster and Vohra [1997] , and Blum and Mansour [2007] . The intuition stems from the following observation. Consider the graph whose vertices are the actions, and two vertices are connected with an edge if the corresponding actions are neighbors. Suppose for each vertex i we have a distribution q i ∈ ∆ N supported on the neighbor set N i . Let p ∈ ∆ N be defined by p = Qp where Q is the matrix [q 1 , . . . , q N ]. Then there are two equivalent ways of sampling an action from p. The first way is to directly sample the vertex according to p. The second is to sample a vertex i according to p and then choose a vertex j within the neighbor set N i according to q i . Because of the stationarity (or flow ) condition p = Qp, the two ways are equivalent. This idea of finding a fixed point is implicit in Foster and Vohra [1997] , and Blum and Mansour [2007] , who show how stationarity can be used to convert external regret guarantees into an internal regret statement. 7 We show here that, in fact, this conversion can be done "locally" and only with "comparison" information between neighboring actions.
Our procedure is as follows. We run N different algorithms A 1 , . . . , A N , each corresponding to a vertex and its neighbor set. Within this neighbor set we obtain small regret because we can construct estimates of loss differences among the actions, thanks to the local observability condition. Each algorithm A i produces a distribution q t i ∈ ∆ N at round t, reflecting the relative performance of the vertex i and its neighbors. Since A i is only concerned with its local neighborhood, we require that q t i has support on N i and is zero everywhere else. The meta algorithm NeigborhoodWatch combines the distributions Q t = [q t 1 , . . . , q
t N ] and computes p t as a fixed point
How do we choose our actions? At each round, we draw K t ∼ p t and then I t ∼ q t Kt according to our two-level scheme. The action I t is the action we play in the partial monitoring game against the adversary. Run local algorithm A kt with the received signal 8:
9: end for Algorithm 3 Local Algorithm A i 1: If t = 1, initialize s = 1 2: For r ∈ {τ i (s − 1) + 1, . . . , τ i (s)} (i.e. for all r since the last time A i was run) construct
and letf Let the action played by the adversary at time t be denoted by J t . Then the feedback we obtain is S It e Jt . This information is passed to A Kt which updates the distributions q t Kt . In Section 6.2.2 we detail how this is done.
The advantage of the above two-level method is that while the actions are still chosen with respect to the distribution q t , the loss difference estimations are only needed locally. The local observability condition ensures that these local estimations can be done without using "non-local" actions.
Analysis of NeigborhoodWatch
Before presenting the main result of this section, we need the concept of local internal regret.
Local internal regret
Let φ : {1, . . . , N } → {1, . . . , N } be a departure function , and let I t and J t denote the moves at time t of the player and the opponent, respectively. At the end of the game, regret with respect to φ is calculated as the difference of the incurred cumulative cost and the cost that would have been incurred had we played action φ(I t ) instead of I t , for all t. Let Φ be a set of departure functions. The Φ-regret is defined as
where the cost function considered in this paper is simply c(i, j) = L i,j . If Φ = {φ k : k ∈ [N ]} consists of constant mappings φ k (i) = k, the regret is called external, or just simply regret: this definition is equivalent to the regret definition in the introduction. For (global) internal regret, the set Φ consists of all departure functions φ i→j such that φ i→j (i) = j and φ i→j (h) = h for h = i.
Definition 9. For a game G, let the graph G be its neighborhood graph: its vertices are the actions of the game, and two vertices are connected with an edge if the corresponding actions are neighbors. A departure function φ i→j is called local if j is a neighbor of i in the neighborhood graph G. Let Φ L be the set of all local departure functions. The Φ L -regret defined with respect to the set of all local departure functions is called local internal regret.
The main result of the paper is the following internal regret guarantee.
Theorem 6. The local internal regret of Algorithm 2 is bounded as
To prove that the same bound holds for the external regret we need two observations. The fist observation is that the local internal regret is equal to the the internal regret:
Lemma 6. There exists a problem dependent constant K such that the internal regret is at most K times the local internal regret.
The second (well-known) observation is that the internal regret is always greater than or equal to the external regret.
Corollary 5. External regret of Algorithm 2 is bounded as
where K is the upper bound from Lemma 6.
We remark that high probability bounds can also be obtained in a rather straightforward manner, using, for instance, the approach of Abernethy and Rakhlin [2009] . Another extension, the case of random signals, is discussed in Section 6.3.
The rest of this section is devoted to prove Theorem 6.
Estimating loss differences
The random variable k t drawn from p t at time t determines which algorithm is active on the given round. Let
I {k t = i}} denote the (random) time when the algorithm A i is invoked for the s-th time. By convention, τ i (0) = 0. Further, define π i (t) = min{t ≥ t : k t = i} to denote the next time the algorithm is run on or after time t. When invoked for the s-th time, the algorithm A i constructs estimates
for all the rounds after it has been run the last time, until (and including) the current time r = τ i (s). We can assume b t (i,j) = 0 for any j / ∈ N i . The estimates b t (i,j) can be constructed by the algorithm because S Ir e jr is precisely the feedback given to the algorithm.
Let F t be the σ-algebra generated by the random variables {k 1 , I 1 , . . . , k t , I t }. For any t, the (conditional) expectation satisfies
where in the second equality we used the fact that
by stationarity (7). Thus each algorithm A i , on average, has access to unbiased estimates of the loss differences within its neighborhood set.
Recall that algorithm A i is only aware of its neighborhood, and therefore we peg coordinates of q t i to zero outside of N i . However, for convenience, our notation below still employs full N -dimensional vectors, and we keep in mind that only coordinates indexed by N i are considered and modified by A i .
When invoked for the s-th time (that is, t = τ i (s)), A i constructs linear functions (cost estimates) f
We now show thatf
has the same conditional expectation as the actual loss of the meta algorithm NeigborhoodWatch at time t = τ i (s). That is, by bounding expected regret of the black-box algorithm operating on {f s i }, we bound the actual regret suffered by the meta algorithm on the rounds when A i was invoked.
Lemma 7. Consider algorithm A i . It holds that
Proof. Throughout the proof, we drop the subscript i on τ i to ease the notation. Note that q
since the distribution is not updated when algorithm A i is not invoked. Hence, conditioned on F τ (s) , the variable (q τ (s+1) i − e u ) can be taken out of the expectation. We therefore need to show that
First, we can write
The last step follows because the event {t ≤ τ (s + 1)} is F t−1 -measurable (that is, variables k 1 , . . . , k t−1 determine the value of the indicator). By (8), we conclude
Since I {t = τ (s + 1)} = I {k t = i} I {t ≤ τ (s + 1)}, we have
Combining with (10),
Observe that coordinates off
, and e u are zero outside of N i . We then have that
is a scalar. When multiplying the above expression by q τ (s+1) i −e u , the term c·1 Ni vanishes. Thus, minimizing regret with relative costs (with respect to the ith action) is the same as minimizing regret with the absolute costs. We conclude that
Regret Analysis
For each algorithm A i , the estimatesf s i are passed to a full-information black box algorithm which works only on the coordinates N i . From the point of view of the full-information black box, the game has length T i = max{s : τ i (s) ≤ T }, the (random) number of times action i has been played within T rounds.
We proceed similarly to Abernethy and Rakhlin [2009] : we use a full-information online convex optimization procedure with an entropy regularizer (also known as the Exponential Weights Algorithm) which receives the vectorf s i and returns the next mixed strategy x s+1 ∈ ∆ N (in fact, effectively in ∆ |Ni| ). We then define q
where γ is to be specified later. Since A i is run at time t, we have τ i (s) = t by definition. The next time A i is active (that is, at time τ i (s + 1)), the action I τi(s+1) will be played as a random draw from q
; that is, the distribution is not modified on the interval {τ i (s) + 1, . . . , τ i (s + 1)}.
We prove Theorem 6 by a series of lemmas. The first one is a direct consequence of an external regret bound for a Follow the Regularized Leader (FTRL) algorithm in terms of local norms [Abernethy and Rakhlin, 2009] . For a strictly convex "regularizer" F , the local norm · x is defined by z x = z T ∇ 2 F (x)z and its dual is z *
Lemma 8. The full-information algorithm utilized by A i has an upper bound
on its external regret, where φ(i) ∈ N i is any neighbor of i,¯ = max i,j L i,j , and η is a learning rate parameter to be tuned later.
Proof. Since our decision space is a simplex, it is natural to use the (negative) entropy regularizer, in which case FTRL is the same as the Exponential Weights Algorithm. From Abernethy and Rakhlin [2009, Thm 2.1], for any comparator u with zero support outside |N i |, the following regret guarantee holds:
An easy calculation shows that in the case of entropy regularizer F , the Hessian
. We refer to Abernethy and Rakhlin [2009] for more details. Let φ : {1, . . . , N } → {1, . . . , N } be a local departure function (see Definition 9). We can then write a regret guarantee
Since, in fact, we play according to a slightly modified version q
Taking expectations of both sides and upper bounding |N i | by N , we get
A proof identical to that of Lemma 7 gives
for the last term, where¯ is the upper bound on the magnitude of entries of L. Putting everything together,
where we have upper bounded T i by T .
As with many bandit-type problems, effort is required to show that the variance term is controlled. This is the subject of the next lemma.
Lemma 9. The variance term in the bound of Lemma 8 is upper bounded as x s , we therefore have two difficulties: controlling the number of constant-size terms and making sure the last term does not explode due to division by a small probability q r i (j). The former is solved below by a careful argument below, while the latter problem is solved according to usual bandit-style arguments.
More precisely, we can writef
We will bound each of the two terms separately, in expectation. For the second term,
The remaining division by the probability disappears under the expectation:
Consider now the second term. As discussed in the proof of Lemma 8, the inverse Hessian of the entropy function shrinks each coordinate i precisely by x s (i) ≤ 1, implying that the local norm is dominated by the Euclidean norm : g
It is therefore enough to upper bound E
2 . The idea of the proof is the following. Observe that P (k t = i|F t−1 ) = P (I t = i|F t−1 ). Conditioned on the event that either k t = i or I t = i, each of the two possibilities has probability 1/2 of occurring. Note that g τi(s−1) inflates every time k t = i, yet I t = i occurs. It is then easy to see that magnitude of g τi(s−1) is unlikely to get large before algorithm A i is run again. We now make this intuition precise.
The function g t is presently defined only for those time steps when t = τ i (s) for some s (that is, when the algorithm A i is invoked). We extend this definition as follows. Let the jth coordinate of g t be defined as
for j ∈ N i and 0 otherwise. The function g t can be thought of as accumulating partial pieces on rounds when I t = i until k t = i occurs. Let us now define an analogue of τ and π for the event that either I t = i or k t = i:
Further, for any t, let ν i (t) = min{t ≥ t : k t = i or I t = i}, the next time occurrence of the event {k τ = i or I τ = i} on or after t. Let
be the indicator of the event that the first time after t that {k τ = i or I τ = i} occurred it was also the case that the algorithm was not run (i.e. k τ = i). Note that g t (j) can now be written recursively as
π(ν(t)+1) (j) .
As argued before, P(I = 1|F t−1 ) = 1/2. We will now show that E {g t (j) | F t−1 } ≤ 2v by the following inductive argument, whose base case trivially holds for t = T :
≤ 2v by induction
The expected value of (g t (j)) 2 can be controlled in a similar manner. To ease the notation, let z = v (i,j) S i e j ν(t) . Using the upper bound for the conditional expectation of g t (j) calculated above,
The argument now proceeds with backward induction exactly as above. We conclude that
and, hence,
Together with (11), we conclude that
Summing over t = 1, . . . , T and observing that only one algorithm is run at any time t proves the statement.
Proof of Theorem 6. The flow condition p t = Q t p t comes in crucially in several places throughout the proofs, and the next argument is one of them. Observe that
and thus
It is because of this equality that external regret with respect to the local neighborhood can be turned into local internal regret. We have that
and so by Lemma 8
With the help of Lemma 9,
with η = log N 24v 2 T . We remark that for the purposes of "in expectation" bounds, we can simply set γ = 0 and still get O( √ T ) guarantees (see Abernethy and Rakhlin [2009] ). This point is obscured by the fact that the original algorithm of Auer et al. [2003] uses the same parameter for the learning rate η and exploration γ. If these are separated, the "in expectation" analysis of Auer et al. [2003] can be also done with γ = 0. However, to prove high probability bounds on regret, a setting of γ ∝ T −1/2 is required. Using the techniques in Abernethy and Rakhlin [2009] , the high-probability extension of results in this paper is straightforward (tails for the terms g τi(s−1) 2 2 in Lemma 9 can be controlled without much difficulty).
Random Signals
We now briefly consider the setting of partial monitoring with random signals, studied by Rustichini [1999] , Lugosi, Mannor, and Stoltz [2008] , and Perchet [2011] . Without much modification of the above arguments, the local observability condition yet again yields O( √ T ) internal regret. Suppose that instead of receiving deterministic feedback H i,j , the decision maker now receives a random signal d i,j drawn according to the distribution H i,j ∈ ∆(Σ) over the signals. In the problem of deterministic feedback studied in the paper so far, the signal H i,j = σ was identified with the Dirac distribution δ σ .
Given the matrix H of distributions on Σ, we can construct, for each row i, a matrix Ξ i ∈ R si×M as
where the set σ 1 , . . . , σ si is the union of supports of H i,1 , . . . , H i,M . Columns of Ξ i are now distributions over signals. Given the actions I t and j t of the player and the opponent, the feedback provided to the player can be equivalently written as S t It e jt where each column r of the random matrix S t It ∈ R si×M is a standard unit vector drawn independently according to the distribution given by the column r of Ξ i . Hence, ES t i = Ξ i . As before, the matrix Ξ (i,j) is constructed by stacking Ξ i on top of Ξ j . The local observability condition, adapted to the case of random signals, can now be stated as:
for all neighboring actions i, j.
Let us specify the few places where the analysis slightly differs from the arguments of the paper. Since we now have an extra (independent) source of randomness, we define F t to be the σ-algebra generated by the random variables {k 1 , I 1 , S 1 . . . , k t , I t , S t } where S t is the random matrix obtained by stacking all S t i . We now define the estimates
with the only modification that S t i and S t j are now random variables. Equation (8) now reads
The rest of the analysis follows as in Section 6.2.3, with Ξ in place of S.
Classification -putting everything together
In this section we use the results of this paper, along with some previous results, to prove the classification theorems 1 and 2. For the convenience of the reader, we recite these theorems:
Theorem 1 (Classification for games against stochastic opponents). Let G = (L, H) be a finite partialmonitoring game. Let K be the number of non-dominated actions in G. The minimax expected regret of G against stochastic opponents is
Theorem 2 (Classification for games against adversarial opponents). Let G = (L, H) be a non-degenerate finite partial-monitoring game. Let K be the number of non-dominated actions in G. The minimax expected regret of G against adversarial opponents is
, G is globally observable but not locally observable; Θ(T ), G is not globally observable.
Proof of Theroems 1 and 2. The following lower bound results are sufficient for both theorems:
• If a game is not globally observable then its minimax regret is Θ(T ) [Piccolboni and Schindelhauer, 2001 ].
• If a game has more than one Pareto-optimal actions then its minimax regret is Ω( √ T ) [Antos et al., 2012] .
• If a game is not locally observable then its minimax regret is Ω(T 2/3 ) (Theorem 4).
On the other hand, the following upper bounds completes the proofs of the theorems:
• If a game has only one Pareto-optimal action then the minimax regret is 0 (trivial: an optimal algorithm chooses the Pareto-optimal action in every time step).
• If a game is globally observable then the algorithm FeedExp by Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [2001] achieves O(T 2/3 ) expected regret .
• For locally observable games, 
Discussion
This paper presents the recent advances made in understanding finite partial-monitoring games. The main achievement of this work is a classification of games based on their minimax regret. Algorithms are presented that achieve the minimax regret within logarithmic factors for any given game.
The immediate open problem is to include the degenerate games in the classification under the adversarial model. We conjecture that the classification extends to degenerate games the same way as under the stochastic model. From a more practical point of view, more computationally efficient algorithms would be helpful, especially in the stochastic case. If the number of actions or outcomes is high, the running time of the CBP algorithm dramatically increases. This is due to the fact that the algorithm runs LP solvers in every time step.
Another important extension is partial monitoring with side information. In the model investigated in this paper, the learner does not receive any additional information about the outcome, or how the outcome is generated, before taking an action. In many practical applications it is not the case. In dynamic pricing, for example, the vendor might (and should) have additional information about the customer, e.g., how much he needs the product or his financial situation. This leads to the model of partial monitoring with side information. A recent work by investigates this setting. They prove that local observability remains the key condition to achieve root-T regret under partial monitoring with side information.
Let a ft be the row of S that corresponds to the feedback symbol f t .
8 Assume k = A(f t−1 ). If the feedback set of action k does not contain f t then trivially p * i (f t |f t−1 ) = 0 for i = 1, 2. Otherwise p * i (f t |f t−1 ) = a ft p i .
Since p 1 − p 2 = 2εv and v ∈ Ker S, we have a ft v = 0 and thus, if the choice of the algorithm is in either Lemma 2. For any {i, j} ∈ N , t ≥ 1, P |δ i,j (t) − δ i,j | ≥ c i,j (t) ≤ 2|V i,j |t 1−2α .
Proof.
P |δ i,j (t) − δ i,j | ≥ c i,j (t) where in (16) we used the triangle inequality and the union bound and in (18) we used Hoeffding's inequality.
Proof. If (P , N ) is a valid configuration, then there is a convex polytope Π ⊆ ∆ M such that p * ∈ Π, P = {i : dim C i ∩ Π = M − 1} and N = {{i, j} : dim C i ∩ C j ∩ Π = M − 2}.
Let p be an arbitrary point in C i ∩ Π. We enumerate the actions whose cells intersect with the line segment p p * , in the order as they appear on the line segment. We show that this sequence of actions i 0 , . . . , i r is a feasible path.
• It trivially holds that i 0 = i, and i r is optimal.
• It is also obvious that consecutive actions on the sequence are in N .
For an illustration we refer the reader to Figure 3 Next, we want to prove lemma 4. For this, we need the following auxiliary result: Lemma 11. Let action i be a degenerate action in the neighborhood action set N + k,l of neighboring actions k and l. Then i is a convex combination of k and l . Proof. For simplicity, we rename the degenerate action i to action 1, while the other actions k, l will be called actions 2 and 3, respectively. Since action 1 is a degenerate action between actions 2 an 3, we have that (p ∈ ∆ M and p⊥( 1 − 2 )) → (p⊥( 1 − 3 ) and p⊥( 2 − 3 ))
Using de Morgan's law we get 1 − 2 ⊇ 1 − 3 ⊕ 2 − 3 . This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.
Proof. For any (not necessarily neighboring) pair of actions {i, j}, the boundary between them is defined by the set B i,j = {p ∈ ∆ M : ( i − j ) p = 0}. We generalize this notion by introducing the margin: for any ξ ≥ 0, let the margin be the set B ξ i,j = {p ∈ ∆ M : |( i − j ) p| ≤ ξ}. It follows from finiteness of the action set that there exists a ξ * > 0 such that for any set K of neighboring action pairs, {i,j}∈K
Let ρ 2 = ξ * /2. Let A = A ρ2 . Then for every pair i, j in A, ( i − j ) p * = δ i,j ≤ δ i + δ j ≤ ρ 2 . That is, p * ∈ B ξ * i,j . It follows that p * ∈ i,j∈A×A B ξ * i,j . This, together with (19), implies that A is a point-local game.
Lemma 6. There exists a problem dependent constant K such that the internal regret is at most K times the local internal regret. :It=i e jt , the empirical frequency of adversarial actions on the rounds when our choice is action i. To prove the claim it is enough to show that for any i ∈ N there exists a K > 0 (that does not depend on T ) and a neighboring action k ∈ N i such that
We may assume that φ(i) is the best response action top i (in other words,p i ∈ C φ(i) ) since this makes the above requirement harder to satisfy. If φ(i) is a neighbor of i, the claim is trivially satisfied with K = 1. Otherwise, pick p ∈ C i to be the centroid of C i and consider the segment [p,p i ] ⊂ ∆ M . Note that on this segment the function f (q) = min i e i Lq is concave and piece-wise linear. Since i and φ(i) are not neighbors, there exists an action k = φ(i) such that k is a neighbor of i and there exists q ∈ [p,p i ] such that i q = k q . It then follows that φ(i)p i ≤ kp i < ip i . The first inequality is an equality whenp i = q , in which case we may simply choose K = 1. Otherwise, let u denote a unit vector in the direction q − p. We may expressp i as q + αu for a constant α > 0. Then we are seeking an upper bound on the ratio
Obviously, the enumerator of the above fraction can be upper bounded by i − φ(i) . Now what is left is to lower bound the denominator. The lower bound depends on the angle between orthogonal of ( i − k ) and the directionp i − p. Since p was chosen as the centroid of C i , this angle (β on Figure 4 (b)) is isolated from zero.
